Reliability planning of active distribution systems incorporating regulator requirements and network-reliability equivalents by Hernando Gil, I. et al.
        
Citation for published version:
Hernando Gil, I, Ilie, I-S & Djokic, SZ 2016, 'Reliability planning of active distribution systems incorporating
regulator requirements and network-reliability equivalents', IET Generation, Transmission and Distribution, vol.
10, no. 1, pp. 93-106. https://doi.org/10.1049/iet-gtd.2015.0292
DOI:
10.1049/iet-gtd.2015.0292
Publication date:
2016
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication
© 2016 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other
users, including reprinting/ republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new
collective works for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted components of this
work in other works.
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 13. May. 2019
1 
 
Reliability Planning of Active Distribution Systems Incorporating Regulator Requirements 
and Network-Reliability Equivalents 
Ignacio Hernando-Gil1, Irinel-Sorin Ilie2 and Sasa Z. Djokic2 
1Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering, University of Bath, Bath BA2 7AY, UK 
2Institute for Energy Systems, University of Edinburgh, King’s Buildings, Mayfield Road, Edinburgh EH9 3JL, UK 
Email: i.hernando.gil@bath.ac.uk  
 
Abstract 
This paper presents an integrated approach for reliability planning and risk estimation in active distribution 
systems. By incorporating the use of accurate reliability equivalents for different MV/LV networks and load 
subsectors, a probabilistic methodology is proposed to capture both power quality and reliability aspects in 
power system planning, which potentially avoids the underestimation of system’s performance at bulk 
supply points. A ‘time to restore supply’ concept, based on security of supply legislation, is introduced to 
quantify the effect of different network functionalities such as the use of backup supply or automatic/manual 
reconfiguration schemes. The range of annual reliability indices reported by 14 network operators in the UK 
is also used for the validation of reliability results, which allows estimating the risk of interruption times 
above the Regulator-imposed limits. Accordingly, conventional reliability assessment procedures are 
extended in this paper by analysing a meshed urban distribution network through the application of a time-
sequential Monte Carlo simulation. The proposed methodology also acknowledges the use of time-varying 
fault probabilities and empirical load profiles for a more realistic estimation of customer interruptions. A 
decision-making approach is shown by assessing the impact of several network actions on the accuracy of 
reliability performance results.   
Keywords: power system reliability, security and quality of supply, distribution network, reliability 
equivalent, customer interruption. 
1. Introduction 
Deregulation and competition in the electricity market put a significant pressure on distribution 
network operators (DNOs) to improve reliability and continuity of the services they provide. Failure 
to deliver electrical energy on promises of better supply quality can result in severe financial 
penalties and may affect their ability to gain new or keep existing customers [1]. However, present 
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distribution systems are designed such that performance of medium voltage (MV) and low voltage 
(LV) networks have a dominant impact on the quality of service seen by end customers. In the UK, 
it is reported that about 90% of customer interruptions (CI) and 97% of customer minutes lost 
(CML) have their cause at voltages between 0.4 kV (i.e. LV) and 20 kV (i.e. MV) [2].  
Energy Regulators impose annual continuity of supply targets for the frequency and duration of 
customer long interruptions (LIs), after which strategies for planning, operation and maintenance 
are designed. However, annual targets are only based on historical reliability records. DNOs report 
the reliability performance of their networks by using energy not supplied (ENS) index [3], and 
indices defined in accordance with [4]: system average interruption frequency index, SAIFI; system 
average interruption duration index, SAIDI; and momentary average interruption frequency index, 
MAIFI. Therefore, in order to limit the impact of supply outages on end-users, Energy Regulators 
develop incentive scheme targets [5], i.e. penalty/reward schemes under different performance 
standards [6] for the restoration of the interrupted supply. In this way, DNOs are required to 
compensate end-users in all cases when network reliability performance is out of the prescribed 
limits, considering also exceptional events such as severe weather conditions [7].   
However, recent statistics suggest that current planning strategies are not successfully 
implemented when risk and reliability network performance is assessed. For example, more than 
14% of DNOs in the UK have recently been penalised for not achieving CI limits, whereas 50% of 
them have not been able to meet CML targets [2]. This is worsened by the minimum overall level of 
accuracy for reporting number and duration of supply interruptions, which in the UK is set at 95% 
[8], allowing DNOs to omit from their reports the 5th percentile of the worst served customers.  
Moreover, network modelling approaches often taken by DNOs, specially applied to active 
distribution systems, may not be adequate as they introduce high levels of uncertainties and, 
therefore, big errors between the estimated and actual reliability indices. This is confirmed in most 
of the reliability performance studies of large power systems, in which LV and MV parts (e.g. 0.4 
kV and 11 kV networks in the UK) are simply represented by an aggregate/bulk load due to the 
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complexity of calculation. In addition, self-extinguishing and transient faults cleared by automatic 
switching, i.e. power quality (PQ)-related events that result only in short interruptions (SIs), are 
usually neglected during the reliability analysis [9]. This clearly confirms the need for the 
probabilistic methodology proposed in this paper, which by incorporating the use of accurate 
network-reliability equivalents and automatic switching functionalities is capable of integrating 
both PQ and reliability aspects in power system planning.  
Within this context, the term ‘active distribution system’ denotes specific network management 
actions and functionalities that will have direct impact on the frequency and duration of long and 
short interruptions of supplied customers. These include implementation of remotely controlled 
system automation, switching and reconfiguration capabilities, as well as the provision of flexibility 
through the use of alternative supply points, aimed at improving reliability performance of both 
existing networks and future smart grids. 
A time-limit concept, based on security and quality of supply (SQS) legislation, is also proposed 
in this paper to quantify the effect of different network functionalities such as the use of back-up 
supply or automatic/manual switching and restoration.  
2. Security and regulator-imposed requirements for supply restoration times 
As each DNO’s reliability performance and network characteristics (i.e. meshed or radial, urban or 
rural) strongly depend on the geographic location and supplied demand, the range of annual 
reliability indices reported by 14 DNOs in the UK (shown in Table 1) is used in this paper for the 
validation of reliability results. Accordingly, a highly meshed urban network would always be 
expected to offer minimum values (increased reliability), while a radial rural system would present 
maximum values (poor reliability). 
Table 1. Annual values of UK DNOs’ reliability indices [2] 
INDEX 
UK DNOs’ Reports 
min mean max 
SAIFI (interruptions/customer/year) 0.29 0.71 1.19 
SAIDI (hours/customer/year) 0.57 1.09 1.84 
MAIFI (interruptions/customer/year) 0.15 0.78 3.3 
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2.1. Security and quality of supply requirements  
After an interruption, the supply to electricity customers must be restored within a specified period 
of time. Therefore, time limits are defined as maximum durations required by SQS legislation to 
restore at least a minimum group demand of customers. The network configuration, protection 
schemes and repair process of the faulted network components are the main features which decide 
the duration of these interruptions. In the UK, six classes of supply (A to F) are defined in [10] 
based on group demand (GD) ranges, for which a maximum duration of interruptions is imposed, so 
that the minimum demand can be met. Table 2 specifies the required limits for supply restorations 
times, which in most of the cases are significantly shorter than the typical ‘mean time to repair’ 
(MTTR) values of power components. 
Table 2. UK security of supply requirements for interrupted customers [10] 
Class of 
Supply 
Range of Group Demand 
(GD) 
Minimum demands to be met after  
first circuit outage 
A GD ≤ 1 MW In repair time: GD 
B 1 MW < GD ≤ 12 MW 
(a) Within 3 h: GD - 1 MW 
(b) in repair time: GD 
C 12 MW < GD ≤ 60 MW 
(a) Within 15 min: min GD - 12 MW; 2/3 GD 
(b) Within 3 h: GD 
D 60 MW < GD ≤ 300 MW 
(a) Immediately: GD - up to 20 MW 
(b) Within 3 h: GD 
E 300 MW < GD ≤ 1500 MW Immediately: GD 
F GD > 1500 MW According to transmission license security standard 
 
It is important to note that each LI outside these limits (apart from exceptional events), and even 
though they do not accrue to specific penalties for DNOs, will progressively shift the overall 
network’s reliability performance outside the specified annual targets. 
 
2.2. Duration of interruption requirements for electricity customers  
In the UK, the Regulator specifies additional requirements for the duration of interruptions to 
protect electricity customers from excessive LI events. These requirements are introduced to protect 
those categories of customers that have no special contracts or agreements with the DNOs regarding 
the duration of interruptions (e.g. domestic/residential customers). Table 3 presents the maximum 
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admissible durations of interruptions, for up to and more than 5,000 customers [7], together with the 
corresponding penalties DNOs must pay directly to customers (not to the Regulator), if supply is 
not restored within the specified periods of time. 
Table 3. UK regulator-imposed requirements for supply restoration times [7] 
No. of Interrupted 
Customers 
Maximum Duration to 
Restore Supply 
Penalty paid to: 
Domestic Customers 
Non- 
Domestic Customers 
Less than 5,000* 
18 h £54 £108 
After each succeeding 12 h £27 £27 
5,000* or more 
24 h £54 £108 
After each succeeding 12 h £27 £27 
*5,000 customers correspond to about 12 MW residential load. 
 
 
3. Reliability equivalents of LV and MV distribution networks 
Reliability indices calculated by conventional network modelling approaches are often inaccurate, 
as failures of power components in those parts of the system represented by bulk loads cannot be 
modelled correctly. Accordingly, if correct failure rates and repair times are allocated to a bus or 
substation where a bulk load is connected, an accurate reliability equivalent model can be 
formulated by simplifying the analysed large network and thus reducing simulation times.  
Building up on the distribution network equivalents previously calculated in [11], this paper 
presents a general methodology for the calculation of accurate reliability equivalent models for 
different MV/LV distribution systems and load subsectors, ranging from metropolitan to rural areas. 
The methodology is based on recorded failure rates and mean repair times (i.e. MTTR) of those 
power components within the aggregate part of the system, and relevant UK SQS requirements 
(Table 2). The analytical approach proposed for reliability analysis of radial networks in [12] is 
extended in this paper to correctly analyse modern meshed networks with alternative supply points, 
for which supply restoration times are empirically determined. The accuracy of some of the 
calculated reliability equivalent models has been verified in [13]. Fig. 1 illustrates the theoretical 
concept for the aggregate LV and MV network models after the inclusion of reliability equivalents 
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at the bulk supply points (BSPs), where Zeq,LV and Zeq,MV represent their equivalent network 
impedances [11]. 
 
(a) LV network-reliability model 
 
(b) MV network-reliability model 
Fig. 1. Aggregate LV and MV network-reliability models 
 
 
3.1. Input data for reliability equivalent modelling  
Failure rates, λ, and mean repair times, d, are two basic inputs for reliability assessment, especially 
for Monte Carlo simulation (MCS), which first identifies all the components in the modelled 
network and their reliability characteristics. Thus, the equivalent failure rate (λeq) and equivalent 
repair time (deq) of the LV and MV buses where the bulk load is connected are derived from 
individual λ and d values, which are provided by a comprehensive database [14] for all relevant 
network components in the aggregate part of the system, as shown in Table 4. Further reliability 
data collected from an extensive literature survey for similar power components is provided in [15]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 kV 0.4 kV
Aggregate 
LV Network
Aggregate
Demand
(LV)
Zeq,LV
11/0.4 kV
Transformer
λeq,LV (failures/year) 
deq,LV (hours/year) 
LV Reliability Equivalent 
33 kV 11 kV
Aggregate
MV and LV Network
Aggregate
Demand
(MV and LV)
Zeq,MV
33/11 kV
Substation
λeq,MV (failures/year) 
deq,MV (hours/year) 
MV Reliability Equivalent 
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Table 4. Reliability data for main network components [14] 
Power 
Component  
Voltage 
Level  
(kV) 
Failure Rate 
(failures/year) 
Mean  
Repair Time 
(hours) 
Overhead  
Lines 
0.4 0.168 / km 5.7 
11 0.091 / km 9.5 
33 0.034 / km 20.5 
132 0.0038 / km 19.1 
Cables 
0.4 0.159 / km 6.9 
11 0.051 / km 56.2 
33 0.034 / km 201.6 
132 0.0277 / km 222.7 
Transformers 
11/0.4 0.002 75 
33/0.4 0.01 205.5 
33/11 0.01 205.5 
132/11 0.0392 250.1 
132/33 0.0392 250.1 
400/132 0.0392 250.1 
Buses 
0.4 0.005 24 
11 0.005 120 
>11 0.08 140 
Circuit 
Breakers 
0.4 0.005 36 
11 0.0033 120.9 
33 0.0041 140 
132 0.0264 98.4 
275 0.0264 98.4 
400 0.0264 98.4 
Switch Fuses 11 0.0004 35.3 
 
The equivalent failure rate, λeq (1), of the buses where the aggregate demand is connected can be 
calculated as the sum of the failure rates of all power components (i.e. N) in the LV or MV network. 
The equivalent repair time, deq (2), is calculated as the average value of all components’ mean 
repair times. As a result, each reliability equivalent (λeq and deq) will consider the actual reliability 
performance of all power components (e.g. lines, transformers, buses, protections, etc.) downstream 
the point of aggregation (i.e. LV or MV aggregate buses in Fig. 1) and thus can be used for a more 
accurate calculation of the frequency and duration of interruptions within the lumped network. 
 

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3.2. Reliability equivalent parameters with alternative supply  
This methodology would only be applicable to those power components which interrupt a supplied 
group demand (GD) less or equal than 1 MW, as those outages are not required to comply with any 
SQS requirements (Table 2), and thus can be restored within the component repair time (i.e. MTTR 
values in Table 4). However, further attention should be allocated to those network components at 
MV level interrupting GDs larger than 1 MW, as SQS legislation requires customers with high 
power demands to be supplied with at least one backup supply point. As the duration of customer 
interruptions strongly depends on the actual configuration of power supply systems, highly-urban 
meshed networks will present a lower duration of interruptions than rural radial systems.  
Depending on the interrupted bulk-supplied GD, different restoration times are required to 
restore supply after the first circuit outage (e.g. 15min, 3h, etc, according to UK SQS in Table 2). 
Therefore, the alternative supply concept is introduced in the calculation of the equivalent repair 
time, deq (2), for each subsector by allocating a SQS value to those components causing faults 
which interrupt a demand higher than 1 MW, 12 MW, etc, [10]. Instead of considering MTTR 
values to calculate the equivalent duration of interruptions of bulk loads by simply applying (2), the 
’time to restore supply’ (TTRS) concept will correctly assess the duration of interruptions in the 
equivalent systems.  
Based on the detailed network models from highly-urban to rural areas in [11] and [16], Table 5 
shows the calculated input parameters for the reliability aggregation of generic residential LV 
networks to be connected at the LV BSP in Fig. 1(a), as well as for precisely the MV part (i.e. 11 
kV level) for each type of distribution system, and the combination of both of them (i.e. the whole 
network from 33 kV down to 0.4 kV) to be connected at the MV BSP in Fig. 1(b). Security of 
supply requirements are also provided for each type of distribution network considered. 
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Table 5. Reliability equivalent parameters per network and load subsector 
Reliability Equivalent 
Model Parameters 
FAILURE RATE 
(as in (1)) 
REPAIR TIME 
(as in (2) and [10]) 
Security of Supply 
Requirements 
[10] 
λeq 
(failures/year) 
deq 
(hours/year) 
LV 
Distribution 
Networks 
(residential demand) 
HU 4.31 16.6 
(GD ≤ 1 MW) 
to be met: in Repair Time 
 
U 2.51 17.5 
SU 1.21 18 
Ru 0.87 22 
MV 
Distribution 
Networks 
(from 1ary to 2ary substations) 
HU 1.63 42.5 
(GD > 1 MW and ≤ 12 MW) 
to be met: within 3 h 
and 
(GD > 12 MW and ≤ 60 MW) 
to be met: within 15 min 
U 2.26 45.9 
SU 4.09 67.9 
Ru 4.33 74.4 
Combined 
MV / LV 
Distribution Network 
(aggregate group demands) 
HU 156.6 41.7 
U 122.5 45.1 
SU 57.1 67.4 
Ru 33.7 74.2 
where: HU - highly urban, U - urban, SU - suburban, Ru - rural 
 
Table 5 provides a cross-vector comparison among the SQS network performances from 
different load subsectors, and from LV to MV distribution systems. This is shown, for example, as 
values of deq increase from highly urban to rural areas, due to longer restoration times required in 
radial systems. On the other hand, the higher demand concentration in metropolitan areas and the 
higher number of installed components in meshed networks (especially at LV) make the values of 
λeq and so their fault probabilities to behave oppositely to deq. However, this trend on the λeq value 
is not applicable to the MV (11 kV) part of the distribution system (from primary to secondary 
substations), as the increased length of MV overhead lines (in comparison with more reliable MV 
underground cables) make the final failure rate (λeq) to increase from highly-urban to rural areas.  
A preliminary validation of this concept was performed in [17], where the calculated reliability 
indices, e.g. CI and CML, were proved to offer a considerably small error of about 2%. The correct 
application of reliability equivalents will avoid the underestimation of reliability performance for 
the aggregate networks connected at LV/MV BSPs. Moreover, system complexity is significantly 
reduced as the electrical and reliability models of all network components no longer need to be 
represented in detail. 
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4. Criteria for risk and reliability analysis 
There is a boundary defined when DNOs try to predict the dysfunctional behaviour of their systems, 
which is established by the load points at MV level. Neglecting outage events that occur within LV 
networks leads to unrealistic performance reports on continuity of supply. Moreover, linear 
regression methods, which rely on extrapolation of past network performances, should be avoided 
and replaced by simulation (i.e. probabilistic) based approaches.  
Although many power system analyses currently use an analytical approach (e.g. network 
capacity planning), the need for probability techniques has been widely recognised in several 
studies (e.g. [18]), as they consider the full stochastic nature of system’s behaviour, demand and 
components’ faults. The decision-making methodology proposed in this paper applies time-
sequential MCS [19-21], which is characterised by the chronological transitions of network 
components from "normal operation" states to "faulted" states, and vice versa [22-23].  
 
4.1. Application of Monte Carlo simulation procedure  
Based on previous developments of the presented MCS technique [15, 24], the operating and failure 
stages of network components are established through the use of a random generator, which is 
assigned to an inverse probability density function (PDF) [20] to convert component failure rates (λ) 
and MTTR values into system states. Accordingly, λ values are considered to follow an exponential 
distribution in this paper, while MTTR or TTRS values (depending on the GD interrupted) are 
modelled through Weibull’s distribution, with the two corresponding scale/shape parameters 
(Rayleigh PDF) according to [25-26]. The simulation is incremented on a year by year time frame 
(in 40-year component’s lifetime cycles) and stopped when convergence is met or 1000 years have 
passed. Every time a component fails to operate, a power flow algorithm is run to check and 
quantify the number of loads affected. The algorithm is implemented in Matlab/Python code, using 
PSSE software [27] to model the analysed distribution network. The main steps of the MCS 
approach used in this paper are summarised in Fig. 2. 
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The MCS methodology also acknowledges the use of time-varying fault probabilities and 
empirical load profiles for a more realistic assessment of customer interruptions. A residential load 
model [28] is selected to represent the demand at the network supply points, providing demand 
decomposition into different load types over the 24 hours of the day, and therefore affecting the 
values of both power factor (p.f.) and reactive power demand. Accordingly, a better correlation 
between the moment in time when a fault occurs in the system and the actual demand interrupted 
(i.e. not simply the rated power) will significantly improve the calculation accuracy of frequency 
and power/energy reliability indices (e.g. ENS index). The MCS procedure also considers to what 
extent the probability of network outages is affected by the overall system loading, hence the 
probability profiles of both SIs and LIs (i.e. time of the day when interruptions occurred) previously 
defined in [15] are incorporated in the MCS algorithm.  
5. Reliability quantification of network functionalities through MCS 
The proposed methodology aims to assess the impact of several network actions on the accuracy of 
reliability performance results. A decision-making approach is shown by comparing different 
scenarios and additions to the simulation procedure, up to the final state in which all possible 
network conditions are considered for an integrated reliability planning.  
The network model for analysis is shown in Fig. 3, which is an underground MV/LV distribution 
network typically operated within UK interconnected urban areas [11]. Although underground MV 
networks present a meshed configuration, they normally operate radially with the support of another 
supply point, either a MV primary substation or a reflection centre offering a closed-loop 
arrangement that guarantees the supply in case of a N-1 failure. This is implemented by the cable 
‘0’, which is a feeder with no load in normal operation, connecting both ends of the network. Due to 
unexpected or planned maintenance operations, an automated protection arrangement [24] is also 
deployed to avoid the interruption of supply to customers. According to the criteria followed by 
DNOs in underground networks [29], tele-controlled circuit breakers (TCBs) and fault-detection 
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mechanisms are modelled in the 11 kV cables at both ends of the distribution system, i.e. between 
the supplying substation and reflection centre.  
 
Fig. 2. General algorithm of the applied MCS procedure 
Input data: failure rates, repair times, load profiles, 
protection settings, security of supply requirements
Create a list with all network components (N) within the 
system, i = 1,…,N
Set up total number of simulations (e.g. T = 1000)
t = 1,…,T 
Set up simulation time for failure thresholds ∆T=1 year
Set up maximum operating time (J) of network 
components (e.g. J = 40 years),   j = 1,…, J
Assess probability of interruptions (54% SIs / 46% LIs)
Initialise t = 0,   (t = t +1)
Initialise i = 0
Select component i = i + 1 from the list of network 
components
Initialise j = 0
 j = j +1
Define probability distribution to model initial conditions 
(exponential, Weibull, Rayleigh or Gamma)
Generate two sets of random variables for computation of 
TTF and TTR
Calculate TTF using 
probability distribution 
equations
Calculate TTR using 
probability distribution 
equations
TTF<∆T
Count failures of 
network components
Run power flow 
algorithm 
Check loads 
unsupplied
Count number of 
interruptions
SI
Duration of SI given 
by protections
LI
no
Duration of LI given 
by TTR / SQS
Centralise frequency and duration of SIs and LIs for 
network component i after year j of simulation  
Calculate average values of the frequency and duration of 
SI and LI at the end of ith component’s operating lifetime
Centralise frequency and duration of SI and LI for all 
network components within the system
Calculate reliability indices
yes
no
yes
no
yes
update j
update t
update i
Application of SQS 
requirements (if backup 
supply is available)
Computation 
of ENS index 
(correlated with 
load profile)
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Fig. 3. Urban (residential) MV distribution network with underground cable meshed configuration 
Initially, the MV network model in Fig. 3 supplies a total of 48 load points (i.e. BSPs), each of 
them supplied by a 500 kVA substation (11/0.4 kV transformer), and therefore representing the 
aggregate residential load of the equivalent LV networks connected at those nodes. The first set of 
scenarios will consider only the power supplied to those 48 aggregate loads (i.e. 48 x 431.3 kW 
max); however, neglecting the events which occur within LV networks will lead to unrealistic 
reports on continuity of supply. The following scenarios will consider the detailed model of urban 
underground LV networks as an attempt to improve the accuracy of reliability results. Accordingly, 
all lumped load points in Fig. 3 (e.g. the dashed-circled part at 0.4 kV) will be represented with a 
detailed LV distribution system (purely residential demand), as presented in Fig. 4 [11]. 
As each LV network supplies a total of 19 load points (points of common coupling (PCC) for 
residential customers), now the total number of loads to track adds up to 912 (48 x 19 LV nodes), 
which will directly impact the reliability results, as the increased number of served loads will 
change the normalised values of the resulting indices. The loading conditions at each LV supply 
node in Fig. 4 are modelled as symmetrical, but as there is a different number of LV customers 
connected at each LV PCC, all results with LV equivalent networks are obtained “per LV load 
point”, not “per LV customer”. 
543MVA
Source
Underground 
cable loop 
arrangement
11kV
33kV
Grid
Supply
System
Zsys
ZSYS=0.0269 + j0.1822  
(p.u. on 100MVA)
15MVA
15MVA
0.4kV
Cable ‘0’
1
2
3
4
5
6
ZT=0.06 + j1
(p.u. on 100MVA)
Reflection Centre
~ 3km
500kVA 500kVA
*2 *3
*4 *5 *6
TOTAL: 9120 customers
(48 transf. x 190 customers/transf.)
(PMAX AV.= 2.27kW/customer)
Total Load MAX AV.= 20.7 MW
*2
*3
*4
*5
*6
 
x 8
11/0.4 kV
Transformers
375m
P
375m 375m 375m 375m 375m 150m
P P P Q Q Q
To another
Primary
Substation
375m 375m
Q Q
Radial 
LV Distribution
(underground cable)
0.4kV
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Fig. 4. Underground LV urban distribution network 
This analysis considers the reliability equivalent model for urban LV networks presented in 
Table 5, providing the equivalent failure rate, λeq = 2.51 failures/year, and equivalent repair time, 
deq = 17.5 hours/year, for the buses where the aggregate LV demand is connected. As a direct 
comparison of this concept, in those scenarios where the equivalent LV networks are not considered 
for reliability analysis, the failure rate (λ) and repair time (MTTR) for a single LV bus are directly 
taken from Table 4, which are only equal to λ = 0.005 failures/year and d = 24 hours/year. The 
significant difference in the failure rate (λ) (now considering the whole LV systems with λeq) will 
considerably affect the total number of load interruptions per year, as the LV parts of the system 
have a dominant impact on the quality of service seen by end customers.  
 
5.1. Network scenarios for reliability planning assessment  
Table 6 provides a general description of the scenarios considered for risk and reliability analysis of 
the test network from Fig. 3.   
 
 
500kVA
Transformer
11kV 0.4kV
ZT=2.04 + j9.28     
(p.u. on 100MVA)
190 customers
PMAX AV.= 2.27kW/customer Total Load MAX AV.= 431.3kW (at 1p.u.)
U1
U2
U3
U4
U5 U6
U7
U8
U9 U10
U11
U12 U13
U14 U15
U16 U17
U18
U19
78.6m
36m
85m
32m 90m 41m 35m 33m 17m
73m 67m
24m 52m
93m 68m 40m
70m
53m 12m
32m
41m
15m 80m 85m
27m 26m 53m
90m
82m
40m 17m
D
E
E
A A B C D E
E E
E E
E E E
E
E E
E
E
D D E
C D E
E
D
E E
L
L
L
L
L L
L
L
L
L
L
L L
L L
L L
L
L
(15 cust.)
(12 cust.)
(12 cust.)
(14 cust.) (9 cust.)
(12 cust.)
(12 cust.) (9 cust.)
(12 cust.) (6 cust.)
(9 cust.) (6 cust.)
(6 cust.)
(15 cust.) (15 cust.)
(8 cust.) (8 cust.)
(6 cust.)
(4 cust.)
* L type line length = 30m
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Table 6. Description of risk and reliability scenarios 
SCENARIO 1: Inherent reliability of network components, modelled with their MTTR values  
(no back-up action) 
SC-1A: No alternative supply (MTTR values, no SQS Reg.) + Constant peak load 
SC-1B: No alternative supply (MTTR values, no SQS Reg.) + Time-varying load profile (TVLP) 
SC-1C: No alternative supply (MTTR values, no SQS Reg.) + Equivalent LV network models + TVLP 
SCENARIO 2: Impact of SQS and Regulator requirements for TTRS on network performance  
(manual back-up action) 
SC-2A: Alternative supply (Restoration < SQS Reg.) + MTTR values (No 18h Reg.) + TVLP 
SC-2B: Alternative supply (Restoration < SQS Reg. + 18h Reg.) + TVLP 
SC-2C: Alternative supply (Restoration < SQS Reg. + 18h Reg.) + Equivalent LV network models + TVLP 
SCENARIO 3: Impact of automatic switching in combination with SQS/Regulator requirements for TTRS  
on network performance 
SC-3A: Alternative supply (Automatic Switching < 3min + 18h Reg.) + TVLP 
SC-3B: Alternative supply (Automatic Switching < 3min + 18h Reg.) + Equivalent LV network models + TVLP 
 
Scenario 1 does not consider the action of any alternative supply or automatically controlled 
switches between the trunk feeders of the meshed network (i.e. no SQS requirements). Therefore, 
the ’inherent’ reliability performance of the network is analysed as if it was operating radially with 
no additional support, so the loads’ supply is only restored in network components’ repair time (i.e. 
MTTR values, Table 4). Regarding the frequency of interruptions, there is no propagation (or side 
effects) of any component’s fault to other loads in the general system due to network 
reconfiguration. As the assessment proceeds from SC-1A to SC-1C, different functionalities are 
added to the reliability analysis, such as the consideration of a time-varying load profile (TVLP) 
over the day (SC-1B), or the addition of the equivalent LV network models to expand the BSPs at 
LV (SC-1C). Scenario SC-1A is considered as the base case to compare any added functionality, 
modelling system loads as a constant peak demand, i.e. 431.3 kW.   
The three cases considered in Scenario 2 investigate the effect of different backup switching 
functionalities on network reliability performance. Since automatic reclosing is not applied in an 
all-underground system (i.e. cable faults are considered to be permanent), the aim of analysis is 
focused on the automation and reconfiguration capabilities provided by the alternative supply at 
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both ends of the network. This is enabled by the TCBs and fault-detection mechanisms modelled in 
the 11 kV cables, which are coordinated to react to any outage in the system and prevent as high 
number of load interruptions as possible. However, the post-fault system’s arrangement might cause 
congestion (i.e. overloading) in a different part of the network and thus lead to a secondary set of 
interruptions somewhere else in the system. For each outage event, the best possible backup supply 
is provided at the 11 kV level from either the underground cable loop arrangement (i.e. reflection 
centre) or the cable ‘0’ that offers available spare capacity (if any) from the infeeding substation. 
Accordingly, SC-2A applies the SQS regulation to the network switching/backup functionalities 
depending on the power interrupted and classes of supply in Table 2. This case considers the 
’manual’ (i.e. not automatic) switching of alternative supply with the applicable time limits of 3 h, 
15 min, etc, while faults interrupting a demand less than 1 MW (SQS requirements) are restored 
within component’s MTTR (Table 4).  
SC-2B evaluates the impact of the maximum duration of interruptions requirement (18 h) for 
domestic customers set by the Regulator (Table 3), assuming the supply restoration depends on the 
action of crew members sent by the DNO to the specific fault location, as there are no backup 
functionalities at LV level (i.e. ≤ 1 MW GD). Thus, faults that before were restored within 
component’s MTTR, for components with MTTR > 18 h now have a maximum restoration time of 
18 hours, by allocating a random outage duration (i.e. LI) taken from a value uniformly distributed 
between 3 min (i.e. > SI values [30]) and 18 h. This enables the analysis of system’s response at the 
time of protecting customers from extremely long interruptions. Accordingly, SC-2C incorporates 
the equivalent LV networks to the analysis proposed in SC-2B. 
Finally, Scenario 3 incorporates an automatic switching functionality to the switches between the 
11 kV trunk feeders and alternative supply. This is considered as a ’smart grid’ case with a very 
high flexibility and low impact on customer’s supply. Interruptions that before were counted as LIs, 
now are restored within 3 minutes (i.e. SIs [30]), so they no longer contribute to SAIFI index but 
have a counter effect on network’s PQ (i.e. MAIFI index). 
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6. Risk assessment results 
Mean values of the resulting reliability indices for the test network are presented in Table 7, which 
are the first measure to assess any reliability benefit from the different scenarios. 
Table 7. Mean reliability indices from analysed scenarios 
Urban 
MV Network 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
SC-1A SC-1B SC-1C SC-2A SC-2B SC-2C SC-3A SC-3B 
SAIFI 
(LIs/load point/yr) 
0.283 0.201 0.071 0.204 0.204 0.07 0.017 0.061 
MAIFI 
(SIs/load point/yr) 
0.305 0.21 0.082 0.213 0.213 0.083 0.393 0.091 
SAIDI 
(h/load point/yr) 
35.02 24.35 1.518 1.6 0.643 0.661 0.358 0.647 
ENS 
(MWh/load point/yr) 
15.042 6.79 0.598 0.396 0.143 0.1703 0.093 0.168 
Avg. No. of LIs 
(per year) 
13.606 9.648 64.752 9.799 9.794 63.714 0.803 55.768 
Avg. No. of SIs 
(per year) 
14.634 10.082 75.114 10.223 10.224 75.298 18.879 83.058 
Avg. Duration  
of all LIs (h) 
123.54 121.14 21.35 7.83 3.15 9.45 21.4 10.58 
 
In SC-1A (base case), no reconfiguration is implemented in the network, and each fault is 
assumed to interrupt peak demand at the LV BSPs (i.e. 431.3 kW), resulting in high values in Table 
7 for duration-based indices such as SAIDI or ENS. However, as soon as SC-1B incorporates a 
TVLP into the analysis, there is a considerable reduction in the frequency of LIs (SAIFI) and SIs 
(MAIFI), which is mainly due to the actual operation of the supplying 33/11 kV substation. If a 
component in one of the parallel branches trips (e.g. a transformer, circuit breaker, etc.), the loading 
conditions on the other branch are checked in the model, and if they exceed 100% of the 
component’s rated power, the branch/component is disconnected due to overloading. Thus, if 
system loads are modelled using a constant peak value (SC-1A), the post-fault overloading 
conditions will occur more frequently than if the loads are modelled with a TVLP (SC-1B), as only 
a portion of the loads (or none) will be interrupted for most faults over the day.  
This contingency situation is illustrated in Fig. 5. When one of the 33/11 kV transformers fails to 
operate (with rated power of 70%-75% of network’s peak load), all demand will still be met by the 
other transformer as long as it is below its rated capacity (100% MVA), i.e. between 23:00 and 
17:00 hours in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5. Overloading of a 33/11 kV transformer during substation contingency 
 
In SC-1C, the equivalent LV networks are included in the analysis, resulting in a higher number 
of LIs and SIs per year (64.752 and 75.114 respectively, compared with 9.648 and 10.082 in SC-
1B) as all components within LV networks are now contributing to the frequency of interruptions in 
the overall system. This gives an estimation of the number of outages that conventional reliability 
studies neglect when modelling the network load points as BSPs. With this new scenario (i.e. 
equivalent LV networks), the rest of average results change according to the new number of served 
loads (48 LV BSPs x 19 LV PCC = 912 load points), to which all reliability indices are now 
normalised, but resulting in a more accurate reliability estimation. 
Regarding the results from Scenario 2, the incorporation of an alternative supply only offers 
corrective measures affecting the duration, but not the frequency of interruptions. As a result, there 
is a progressive reduction in duration-based indices (i.e. SAIDI and ENS) due to the implementation 
of SQS time limits, from SC-2A to SC-2C. Finally, Scenario 3 confirms the improvement in the 
number of LIs per year (0.803 (< than 1) and 55.768 respectively), as SAIFI index is almost brought 
down to zero due to the automatic switching action. Therefore, LIs are now converted into SIs (with 
the counter effect of higher transient faults, i.e. < 3 min), which make MAIFI index to increase and 
therefore worsen the PQ of the network. It must be noted that the reduction in SC-3B is not as 
considerable as in SC-3A. This is due to the fact that the switching functionalities are available in 
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the MV part of the network only, so they cannot prevent most of the events occurring at LV level, 
which are considered with the equivalent LV networks in SC-3B.   
 
6.1. Active network stochastic behaviour  
Due to the inclusion of new functionalities in the system operation, the network "stochastic 
behaviour" at MV level is represented in Fig. 6, where the expected average duration of 
interruptions is provided for the different load points in the urban meshed network of Fig. 3. 
 
(a) No backup (MTTR values) 
 
(b) Inclusion of backup functionalities 
Fig. 6. Average duration of interruptions per network MV load point 
Fig. 6(a) illustrates the MV system’s reliability performance as if it was operated radially, i.e. no 
reconfiguration capabilities. Accordingly, the expected duration of interruptions increases from load 
points closer to the supplying 33/11 kV substation, to those located further in the 11 kV trunk 
feeders. The first network functionality that is quantifiable from Fig. 6(a) is the impact of the TVLP 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
Load Points
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 I
n
te
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
 D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 (
h
o
u
rs
)
 
 
SC-1A SC-1B
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 1617 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 3233 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
5
Load Points
A
v
e
ra
g
e
 I
n
te
rr
u
p
ti
o
n
 D
u
ra
ti
o
n
 (
h
o
u
rs
)
 
 
SC-2A SC-2B SC-3A
20 
 
models, which considerably decrease the expected duration of interruptions (from SC-1A to SC-1B) 
as a consequence of the lower number of LIs. However, the resulting average values are still 
unrealistic, as no SQS/regulator-imposed requirements are considered yet, i.e. Fig. 6(b). These 
results emphasise the importance of including the 18-hour threshold to protect customers from 
extremely long interruptions. In SC-2A, load points located at the end of the 11 kV trunk feeder (i.e. 
class A, < 1 MW interrupted) are not completely protected from LIs, and therefore their expected 
outage durations sharply increases in comparison with the rest of load points. As soon as all 
reconfiguration and automatic switching functionalities are modelled in the simulation (i.e. SC-2B 
and SC-3A), a considerable reduction is obtained for all load points. Accordingly, the impact of 
each action can be quantified with respect to the others, which can potentially be used by DNOs for 
decision-making processes. However, system faults within LV levels are still neglected if LV 
network equivalents are not considered in the simulation.    
 
6.2. Frequency of interruptions analysis  
The calculated PDFs of the frequency-based reliability indices (i.e. SAIFI for LIs and MAIFI for 
SIs) are provided in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 respectively.  
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(b) Inclusion of backup functionalities 
 
(c) Inclusion of LV network equivalents 
Fig. 7. Distribution of SAIFI index for all network scenarios 
 
Apart from the impact of the TVLP on the frequency of interruptions (SC-1B), no change is 
experienced in the number of interruptions when SQS/Regulator-imposed requirements are included 
in the simulation (SC-2A and SC-2B), as these scenarios mostly affect the duration of interruptions 
only. For these cases, the PDFs show a sudden increase in the values around 1 interruption/load 
point/year, which corresponds to network faults affecting the total number of load points in the 
system, e.g. faults taking place in the supplying 33/11 kV substation. As reliability indices are 
calculated based on the total number of supplied loads, when all of them are interrupted, SAIFI and 
MAIFI indices are computed as 1 interruption/load point/year, therefore contributing to the 
probability of faults around that value. Another network characteristic to highlight is the one offered 
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by SC-3A, which shifts the resulting SAIFI distribution to values in the vicinity of zero (Fig. 7(b)), 
but increases the probability of MAIFI index in Fig. 8(b). Again, this effect is due to the ‘smart 
grid’ automatic switching, avoiding the occurrence of the majority of LI events and turning them 
into transient faults (SIs), which obviously will have a strong impact on network’s PQ.  
In contrast, a different distribution is obtained for SAIFI and MAIFI indicators in Fig. 7(c) and 
Fig. 8(c), as faults within LV networks have a major contribution to the overall system reliability. 
The resulting PDFs drastically reduce the dispersion of results around the mean value, providing a 
more realistic estimation (i.e. the closest match) of the actual number of interruptions taking place 
in this type of urban networks. With the inclusion of equivalent LV networks in MCS, the number 
of faults considered in the simulation increases, but so does the number of served loads for the 
computation of final reliability indices. Also, the probability of SAIFI and MAIFI indices is 
reduced and increased respectively when SC-3B (‘smart grid’ automatic switching) is assessed, 
affecting the final number of LIs and SIs. 
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(b) Inclusion of backup functionalities 
 
(c) Inclusion of LV network equivalents 
Fig. 8. Distribution of MAIFI index for all network scenarios 
 
6.3. Duration of interruptions analysis  
The duration-based PDFs obtained for SAIDI index are presented in Fig. 9. In this case, the 
duration of interruptions is a common factor for every type of network (i.e. from radial to meshed 
systems, according to the generalised SQS/Regulator requirements), and thus can be directly 
compared with DNOs’ reported values (Table 1). This validation can be used for network planning 
purposes in order to estimate the risk probability (%) that falls outside the reported thresholds and 
thus identify parts of DNOs’ networks in need of reinforcement. 
As shown in Fig. 9, the first scenarios (SC-1A and SC-1B) provide unrealistic values for the 
outage durations as no backup supply is considered in the simulation. As soon as SQS/Regulator 
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time thresholds are included in the model, the resulting PDFs (SC-2A and SC-2B) start to provide 
SAIDI values closer to the stipulated values. Moreover, SC-3A (automatic switching) provides a 
considerable reduction in the durations’ probability, which is only applicable to benefits at the MV 
level of the system, as load points are still modelled as BSPs and no faults are considered within LV 
networks.  
This effect is shown in Fig. 9(c), which provides more accurate results by considering the longer 
fault durations within LV networks, due to the fact that no backup actions can be taken to restore 
the supply (i.e. Class A demand). The higher faults contribution (with their corresponding durations 
for SAIDI) makes the resulting PDFs to concentrate over a clear mean value, providing less 
dispersion of results and emphasising the benefits from the use of LV reliability equivalents. 
Overall, scenarios SC-2C and SC-3B provide a more realistic solution for an accurate planning of 
system reliability (against DNOs’ reported figures), as they consider all possible network 
functionalities, and now the results offered by the automatic switching are not overestimated as it 
was the case with SC-3A.  
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(b) Inclusion of backup functionalities 
 
(c) Inclusion of LV network equivalents 
Fig. 9. Distribution of SAIDI index for all network scenarios 
 
6.4. Risk assessment of load interruption times  
All network restoring functionalities can be more easily quantified with the actual durations of 
interruptions obtained from MCS, which will avoid masking the results by normalising over the 
total number of served loads. Therefore, the impact of the different scenarios on network outages is 
illustrated in Fig. 10. 
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(a) No backup (MTTR values) 
 
(b) Inclusion of backup functionalities 
 
(c) Inclusion of LV network equivalents 
Fig. 10. Impact of network functionalities on load interruption times 
As a base case, Fig. 10(a) presents the raw probability for the duration of interruptions in the 
urban network, as no backup action is implemented in the MCS model. This illustrates the ’natural’ 
behaviour of network components reacting to actual MTTR values and thus resulting in very long 
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interruptions. On the other hand, the impact of SQS restoration on network’s MV level (i.e. the one 
directly connected to the backup supply and reconfiguration switches) is presented in Fig. 10(b), 
where load points are only modelled as BSPs. The probability for the duration of interruptions is 
now modified according to SQS requirements. In the urban network of Fig. 3, most components at 
MV belong to the SQS ’class demand’ B (i.e. interrupting GDs between 1 MW and 12 MW), so the 
supply in those cases must be restored within 3 hours. This backup effect is shown by SC-2A and 
SC-2B, presenting an accumulated probability within 3 hours, where the curve’s tail of the former 
PDF (SC-2A) is much longer (affecting the average duration) as the penalty threshold of 18 hours 
(SC-2B) is still not implemented in the network model. Moreover, the automatic switching 
introduced by SC-3A drastically eliminates the peak probability of LIs (< 3 h) as now those 
interruptions are restored in less than 3 minutes, so they are not counted as LIs anymore. Thus, the 
resulting PDF of SC-3A only considers the probability of a reduced number of LIs in the network. 
Finally, Fig. 10(c) emphasises the need of including the equivalent LV networks in the model, so 
all the interruptions taking place in the network (also at LV level) are considered for a more 
accurate reliability estimation of network performance. In this case, the resulting PDFs show the 
high percentage/contribution of faults occurring within LV networks (GD class A, < 1 MW), which 
are usually neglected by conventional MCS procedures. These final results (Fig. 10(c)) were 
validated against the actual probability data for unplanned outages in networks operated by a UK 
DNO [31], which showed a high correlation on network’s real response to different SQS and 
switching/restoration actions. 
7. Concluding remarks  
This paper presents an integrated approach for reliability planning and risk estimation in active 
distribution systems. Based on generic network models for different load subsectors, a general 
methodology is developed for reducing system complexity by calculating reliability equivalent 
models of LV and MV distribution networks. These reliability equivalents, based on the 
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aggregation of individual power components, avoid the underestimation of system’s performance at 
BSPs, which clearly demonstrates that methods currently used for network reliability assessment 
should be adapted for an appropriate estimation of the upcoming ’smart grid’ functionalities. 
Accordingly, conventional reliability assessment procedures are extended in this paper to include 
actual load profiles, empirical fault probability distributions, as well as UK SQS legislation 
imposing times to restore supply for interrupted customers. The accuracy and applicability of the 
proposed methodology is validated through different network scenarios, and expressed by system-
related reliability indices. 
Regarding the essential considerations for the planning of distribution system’s reliability, the 
analysis is focused on the expected changes in this type of active networks and on the new 
challenges they introduce to quality of supply studies. Therefore, the stochastic behaviour of the 
urban test network is assessed by applying different reconfiguration and switching schemes 
available to DNOs. The proposed methodology allows estimating the risk of interruption times 
above the Regulator-imposed limits when system’s reliability performance is tested to respond to 
those targets. 
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